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1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper there will be discussed foundations of quantum mechanics in
connection to quantum information theory. Such a discussion is very impor-
tant, since intensive development of models of quantum computing, cryp-
tography and teleportation as well as general quantum information theory
induced large interest to the very foundations of quantum theory. Many
questions that have been of only theoretical (or even only philosophic) value
for many years now play a fundamental role in applied and even technologi-
cal investigations. For example, security of quantum cryptographic schemes
and, consequently, prices of corresponding market products and technologies
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depend crucially on such general quantum problems as complementary and
nonlocality.
We can speak about renaissance in the study of foundations of quantum
theory.
And this renaissance in quantum foundations was prepared by quantum
information theory, see e.g. [1], where more than 50 talks were presented at
section ”Shannon meets Bohr”.
In the plenary talk of K.A. Valeev at the present conference there was
given a list of fundamental features of quantum mechanics (QM) that are
very important for quantum computing (as well as cryptography, and tele-
portation).
I would like to present a similar list of distinguishing features of QM and
discuss roles that those features play in our understanding of quantum reality
and, in particular, quantum information theory. Formally K.A. Valeev and I
discuss the same class of problems. However, our viewpoints to these prob-
lems are quite different. K.A. Valeev presented the conventional viewpoint
to foundations of QM. From the conventional point of view all fundamental
problems of QM (besides the problem of measurement) are already solved.
For quantum computing (as well as cryptography and teleportation) this
means that from the theoretical point of view this theory is well established.
There are only experimental and technological problems. I do not think so!
In this paper, see also [2], I shall present nonconventional views to foun-
dations of QM and consider some consequences for quantum information
theory. I start with the list of distinguishing features of QM:
(S) This is a statistical theory of measurement.
(D) Discreteness of some fundamental physical variables.
(C) Principle of complementarity.
(NL) Nonlocality.
2 CONVENTIONAL INTERPRETATION
We start with (S). I think that everybody would agree that QM is a formalism
that describes statistical properties of large ensembles of very special physical
systems, so called quantum systems. QM could not say anything definite
about behaviour of individual quantum systems. In quantum formalism there
is nothing about trajectories of individual quantum systems. We still do not
know anything about dynamics of individual electrons in atom and so on.
2
N. Bohr rightly pointed out that quantum formalism is not about quantum
physical systems, but about our measurements on such systems. We can
formulate this principle as Principle of contextuality. As a consequence
of this principle, we have to take into account the whole physical arrangement
of an experiment.
We continue to discuss (S). As a consequence of (S), it seems to be natu-
ral to assume that a quantum state should describe statistical properties of
an ensemble of physical systems that were prepared under the same complex
of physical conditions, physical context. However, by the conventional
(orthodox Copenhagen) interpretation of QM a wave function provides the
complete description of an individual quantum system. Such a view-
point, i.e., coupling of a wave function to an individual quantum system,
induces hard problems in foundations of QM. One of them is the well known
problem of measurement, see e.g. [3].
Another (less known, but not less important) problem is the problem
of the origin of quantum randomness. By using the conventional interpre-
tation of QM we could not apply the conventional ensemble approach to
probability theory, see e.g. [4], [2]. Typically there are used such words as
“irreducible quantum randomness”, see e.g. [4]. However, such irreducible
randomness could not be explained by using conventional probability the-
ory (Kolmogorov, 1933). Typically it is said that conventional probability
theory does not work in quantum physics. We should use a new quantum
calculus of probabilities based on linear algebra in the Hilbert space of quan-
tum states. In fact such a viewpoint is strongly supported by very strange
(nonconventional) behaviour of quantum probabilities. It is well known that
the classical rule for the addition of probabilities of alternatives:
P = P1 + P2 (1)
does not work in experiments with elementary particles. Instead of this rule,
we have to use quantum rule:
P = P1 + P2 + 2
√
P1P2 cos θ. (2)
The classical rule for the addition of probabilities of alternatives is perturbed
by so called interference term.
Nevertheless, many famous physicists did not want to follow to the con-
ventional (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics. In particu-
lar, A. Einstein supported the ensemble viewpoint to a quantum state. He
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wanted to preserve the conventional ensemble viewpoint even for quantum
probabilities. The origin of his views can be easily explained. In fact, in their
pioneer papers M. Planck and A. Einstein used methods of classical statis-
tical mechanics (in particular, conventional probability theory) to describe
black body radiation and photoelectric effect. The only modification of clas-
sical statistical mechanics was due to the recognition of the principle (D) for
the momentum variable. In some sense it was nothing than comeback to the
purely corpuscular model of light (developed, for example, by Newton). How-
ever, a little bit later the purely corpuscular viewpoint to quantum systems
became inconsistent with statistical data obtained in diffraction and inter-
ference experiments. This statistical data followed to quantum probabilistic
rule (2) and not to conventional probabilistic rule (1).
To resolve this paradox between purely corpuscular behaviour of quan-
tum systems in some experiments and purely wave behaviour in other experi-
ments, N. Bohr proposed the principle of complementarity, (C). By (C) there
exists incompatible complexes of experimental physical conditions (contexts)
determining incompatible physical observables, e.g. position and momentum.
We remark that very often (C) is identified with Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle. Of course, it is well known that N. Bohr proposed principle (C)
after numerous discussions with W. Heisenberg on his uncertainty princi-
ple. However, (C) is essentially wider than Heisenberg’s principle of mutual
perturbations inducing incompatible observables.
We remark that fathers of the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of
QM from the very beginning were strongly against the possibility to reduce
quantum randomness to classical randomness. From the beginning it was
claimed that it is even in principle impossible to create a kind of determin-
istic (classical-like) model that would reproduce quantum probabilities via
e.g. uncertainty in initial conditions and other parameters. W. Heisenberg
claimed this already in 1926 directly after the publication of his first paper
on noncommutative representation of quantum of observables. Such a view-
point was supported by N. Bohr in his discussions with A. Einstein on the
EPR paradox. It was the conventional viewpoint that quantum mechanics is
complete and it would be impossible to provide finer description of physical
reality.
As we know at present time, such a viewpoint was not justified. There
exist classical-like models reproducing quantum probabilities. We can men-
tion e.g. Bohmian mechanics and stochastic electrodynamics. Of course,
these models are not free of problems. However, I do not think that any of
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these problems is essentially harder than e.g. the problem of measurement
in the conventional Copenhagen approach. I think that immediate rejec-
tion of classical like prequantum models is merely a consequence of general
prejudice against such models. For example, Bohmian mechanics is typi-
cally criticized for its nonlocality. However, at the same time it is widely
accepted that conventional QM is nonlocal. Moreover, people totally forgot
that Bell’s arguments that nowadays are used to support quantum nonlocal-
ity were originally proposed to support Bohmian mechanics. In fact, J. Bell
was against locality and not against realism. Realism in the EPR-Bohm
experiment (and, as a consequence, the possibility of deterministic descrip-
tion) was from the beginning evident for J. Bell as the direct consequence
of the precise anticorrelations. J. Bell wanted to prove nonlocality of any
deterministic prequantum model.1
3 CONTEXTUAL ENSEMBLE INTERPRE-
TATION
In the series of papers [5]-[7] I develop contextual probabilistic approach to
QM. One of the main distinguishing features of this approach is demysti-
fication of quantum probabilities and, as a consequence, the whole QM. I
started with (S) – understanding of the fact that QM is just a special the-
ory of statistical measurements. Then I tried to find a condition that would
specify this theory of statistical measurements among all possible theories of
statistical measurements. In particular, such a condition should distinguish
QM and classical statistical mechanics (both considered as theories of sta-
tistical measurements). Moreover, there should be a kind of correspondence
principle that would establish transition from quantum statistics to classical
statistics. The fundamental postulate of our model is the following one:
“Probabilities for all physical observables depend on complexes
of experimental conditions under that measurements of observables
are performed.”
We call this principle “principle of contextual probabilities.” This prin-
ciple of contextual probabilities is closely related to Bohr’s principle of con-
textuality. However, there is very important difference between those two
1I would like to thank Shelly Goldstein who explained to me Bell’s views to reality and
locality.
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principles. Bohr’s principle is a principle of individual contextuality. The
basic notion related to Bohr’s principle of contextuality is the notion of
individual physical phenomenon. Such a phenomenon is determined by a
complex of experimental physical conditions. My principle is a principle of
statistical contextuality. The basic notion related to my principle is the no-
tion of contextual probability. Let us consider the two slit experiment, see
also further derivation of quantum probabilistic rule (2). For N. Bohr it is
important that each individual spot on the registration screen depends on
the whole experimental arrangement (e.g. both slits are open or only one of
them). For me it is important that the probability distribution of spots on
the registration screen depends on the whole experimental arrangement. Of
course, the reader could argue that there is not so much difference between
individual and statistical contextuality. However, the situation is not so sim-
ple. Roughly speaking Bohr’s individual contextuality does not imply that
probability spaces used in quantum theory should depend on complexes of
experimental conditions. Under Bohr’s assumption on individual contextu-
ality it is still possible (at least in principle) to consider physical observables
as random variables on one fixed probability spaces: various complexes of
physical conditions just determine various physical observables. In particu-
lar, after 75 years of Bohr’s individual contextualism it was still unclear why
quantum probabilities follow to rules induced by the Hilbert space structure
and not by the structure of conventional probability theory.
In papers [5]-[7] it was demonstrated (and it was surprising even for me)
that starting with only the principle of contextual probabilities we can derive
quantum probabilistic rule (2). In its general form (2) is quantum generaliza-
tion of the well known formula of total probability. We discuss the contextual
probabilistic interpretation of (2) on the basis of the well known two slit ex-
periment.
In the two slit experiment rule (2) is induced by combining of statistical
data obtained in three different experiments: both slits are open; only jth
slit is open, j = 1, 2. The main distinguishing feature of statistical data ob-
tained in these three experiments in the following one. By combining by (1)
data obtained in experiments in that only one of slits is open we do not get
the probability distribution for data obtained in the experiment in that both
slits are open. On the other hand we never observe a particle that passes
through both slits simultaneously - it would be observed passing the first or
second slit. There is no the direct observation of particle splitting. As each
particle passes only one of slits, we have the standard case of alternatives.
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Thus we should use conventional rule (1) for the addition of probabilities of
alternatives. This disagreement between experimental statistical data and
the rule of conventional probability theory looks as a kind of paradox. The
traditional solution of this paradox is the use of the wave model for elemen-
tary particles and, as a consequence, the principle of complementarity. We
now perform detailed contextual analysis for the two slits experiment. We
consider the following complexes of physical conditions, contexts.
S =both slits are open, Sj =only jth slit is open, j = 1, 2.
In fact, probabilities in (2) are related to these three contexts. Thus
P = PS(E) and Pj = PS→SjPSj(E), j = 1, 2. Here we use various context-
indexes. The PS(E), PSj(E) denote probabilities of an event E with respect
to various contexts. The coefficients PS→Sj , j = 1, 2, have another mean-
ing. In general these are not probabilities of contexts Sj with respect to
the context S (besides some very special, “classical”, situations), because
the context Sj in general is not an event for the context S. In general we
could not consider a complex of physical conditions Sj as an event in the
probabilistic space induced by some fixed context S.
The coefficients PS→Sj , j = 1, 2, are kinds of splitting coefficients. To
be more precise, we consider some fixed source of particles and some fixed
period T during that we collect particles arriving to the registration screen.
We consider an ensemble E that consists of all particles that are collected
on the registration screen during the period T, when both slits are open.
An ensemble Ej consists of all particles that are collected on the registration
screen during the period T, when only jth slit is open. Suppose that E
contains N particles and Ej contains Nj particles. Then splitting coefficients:
PS→Sj ≈
Nj
N
, (3)
see [5] for the details. Here we use the symbol ≈, since numbers N and Nj
vary from one run (of duration T ) to other run (of the same duration). But
if N →∞, then fluctuations are negligibly small.
We remark (and it is important for our further considerations) that we
have the following statistical alternative condition:
PS→S1 + PS→S2 = 1. (4)
The statistical alternative condition has the following meaning: the total
number of particles that arrive to the registration screen when both slits are
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open equals (in the average) to the sum of corresponding numbers when only
one of the slits is open. So by closing e.g. the first slit we do not change the
number of particles that pass the second slit (in the average). In fact, (4)
gives the right description of alternative-situation in the two slit experiment.
It is not related to alternative passing of slits by a particle in the experiment
when both slits are open. This equation describes alternative sharing of
particles between two preparation procedures: jth slit is open, j = 1, 2.
However, the splitting coefficients PS→Sj would not play so important role in
our considerations. The crucial role will be played by contextual probabilities
PS(E), PSj(E).
The conventional probability theory says that, in fact, we should have:
P (E) = P (S1)P (E/S1) + P (S2)P (E/S2). (5)
There is assumed that complexes of physical conditions S1 and S2 could be
considered as events with respect to probability space containing E as an
event and
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and S1 ∪ S2 = S.
This is the well known formula of total probability. In many considerations
(including works of fathers of quantum mechanics, see e.g. P. Dirac and
also R. Feynman) people set P = P (E) and Pj = P (S1)P (E/S1). Finally,
they get the contradiction between conventional probabilistic rule (1) (that
in fact coincides with (5)) and statistical data obtained in the interference
experiments and described by quantum rule (2).
We would like to discuss physical and mathematical assumptions used in
the conventional derivation of (5). The main physical assumption is that this
formula is derived for one fixed context S - in the mathematical formalism
- for one fixed Kolmogorov probability space; see my book [2] on extended
discussions on the role of the choice of Kolmogorov’s probability space in
quantum measurements. To be precise, we have to write the conventional
formula of total probability as
PS(E) = PS(S1)PS(E/S1) + PS(S2)PS(E/S2), (6)
taking into account that all probabilities are computed with respect to the
same complex of physical conditions S.
As we have already remarked, in Kolmogorov probability theory it is also
important that contexts S1,S2 can be realized as elements of the field of
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events corresponding to the context S. Thus we would get the contradic-
tion between classical rule (1) and quantum rule (2) only if we assume that
splitting coefficients PS→Sj can be interpreted as PS-probabilities, PS→Sj =
PS(Sj) and contextual probabilities PSj(E) as conditional probabilities with
respect to the context S, PSj (E) = PS(E/Sj). Here the conditional probabil-
ities are given by Bayes’ formula (the additional postulate of Kolmogorov’s
probability theory): PSj (E) = PS(E ∩ Sj)/PS(Sj).
But in general there are no reasons to assume that new complexes of
conditions Sj are “so nice” that new probability distributions are given by
the Bayes’ formula. Thus, in general, the formula of total probability can
be violated when we combine statistical data obtained for a few distinct
contexts. In particular, it is not surprising that this formula does not hold
true in statistical experiments with elementary particles, where the right
hand side of this formula is perturbed by the interference term.
The following simple considerations give the derivation of quantum prob-
abilistic transformation (2) in the classical probabilistic framework. Let S
and Sj , j = 1, 2, be three different complexes of physical conditions. We
consider the transformation of probabilities induced by transitions from one
complex of conditions to others:
S → S1 and S → S2. (7)
We start with introducing of splitting coefficients, PS→Sj . These are propor-
tional coefficients for numbers of physical systems obtained after preparations
under the complexes of physical conditions S and Sj . If (starting with the
same number of particles radiated by some fixed source) we get N and Nj
systems after S and Sj preparations, respectively, then PS→Sj are defined
by (3). We assume that splitting coefficients satisfy to statistical alternative
equation (4). This is quite natural conditions: splitting (7) of the context
S induces just sharing of physical systems produced by a source. We have
already discussed this sharing in the two slit experiment. The same situation
we have in neutron interferometry for sharing of particles coming to detectors
when both paths are open and when just one of the paths is open.
We introduce the measure of statistical perturbations δ induced by context
transitions:
δ(S → Sj ;E) = PS→S1[PS(E)− PS1(E)] + PS→S2[PS(E)− PS2(E)].
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This quantity describes the deformation of probability distribution PS due
to context transitions. By using statistical alternative equation (4) we get:
PS(E) = PS(E)PS→S1 + PS(E)PS→S2.
Thus we get:
PS(E) = PS→S1PS1(E) + PS→S2PS2(E) + δ(S → Sj;E). (8)
Transformation (8) is the most general form of probabilistic transformations
that can be induced by context transitions. We can formulate a kind of cor-
respondence principle connecting context unstable and context stable (“clas-
sical”) transformations of probabilities:
If Sj → S, j = 1, 2, i.e., δ(S → Sj ;E)→ 0, then contextual probabilistic
transformation (8) coincides (in the limit) with the conventional formula of
total probability.
The perturbation term δ(S → Sj ;E) depends on absolute magnitudes of
probabilities. It would be natural to introduce normalized coefficient of the
context transition
λ(S → Sj ;E) = δ(S → Sj ;E)
2
√
PS1/SPS1(E)PS→S2PS2(E)
,
that gives the relative measure of statistical deviations that can be induced by
transitions from one complex of conditions, S, to others, Sj . Transformation
(8) can be written in the form:
PS(E) =
∑
j=1,2
PS→SjPSj(E) + 2
√
PS→S1PS1(E)PS→S2PS2(E) λ(S → Sj;E) .
(9)
In fact, there are two possibilities:
1). |λ(S → Sj;E)| ≤ 1;
2). |λ(S → Sj;E)| ≥ 1.
In both cases it is convenient to introduce a new context transition pa-
rameter θ = θ(S → Sj ;E) and represent the context transition coefficient in
the form:
λ(S → Sj ;E) = cos θ(S → Sj ;E), θ ∈ [0, pi];
and
λ(S → Sj ;E) = ± cosh θ(S → Sj ;E), θ ∈ [0,∞),
respectively.
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We introduced a “phase parameter” θ by purely mathematical reasons:
to get a linear representation of probabilistic transformations induced by
context transitions, see section 4. However, in some experiments it could
occur that such a probabilistic parameter θ has some geometric meaning.
This induces the illusion of a wave associated with a particle. However, in
our contextual probabilistic framework this is just a wave of probability. Such
a “wave” is associated not with an individual particle, but with an ensemble
of particles (in fact, with a transition from one ensemble to another).
We have two types of probabilistic transformations induced by the tran-
sition from one complex of conditions to another:
PS(E) =
∑
j=1,2
PS→SjPSj(E)+2
√
PS→S1PS1(E)PS→S2PS2(E) cos θ(S → Sj;E) .
(10)
PS(E) =
∑
j=1,2
PS→SjPSj(E)±2
√
PS→S1PS1(E)PS→S2PS2(E) cosh θ(S → Sj ;E) .
(11)
We derived quantum probabilistic rule (2) in the classical probabilistic frame-
work (in particular, without any reference to superposition of states) by tak-
ing into account context dependence of probabilities.
Relatively large statistical deviations are described by transformation
(11). Such transformations do not appear in the conventional formalism
of quantum mechanics. In principle, they could be described by so called
hyperbolic quantum mechanics, [5].
Conclusion. For each fixed context (experimental arrangement), we
have CLASSICAL STATISTICS. CONTEXT TRANSITION induces inter-
ference perturbation of the conventional rule for the addition of probabilistic
alternatives.
4 LINEAR ALGEBRA FOR PROBABILI-
TIES
One of the main distinguishing features of quantum theory is the Hilbert
space calculus for probabilistic amplitudes. As we have already discussed,
this calculus is typically associated with wavelike (superposition) features
of quantum particles. We shall show that, in fact, the Hilbert space repre-
sentation of probabilities was merely a mathematical discovery. Of course,
11
this discovery simplifies essentially probabilistic calculations. However, this
is pure mathematics; physics is related merely to the derivation of quantum
interference rule (2).
The crucial point was the derivation (at the beginning purely experi-
mental) of transformation (2) connecting probabilities with respect to three
different contexts. In fact, linear algebra can be easily derived from this
transformation. Everybody familiar with the elementary geometry will see
that (2) just the well known cos-theorem. This is the rule to find the third
side in a triangle if we know lengths of two other sides and the angle θ between
them:
c2 = a2 + b2 − 2ab cos θ .
or if we want to have ”+” before cos we use so called parallelogram law:
c2 = a2 + b2 + 2ab cos θ . (12)
Here c is the diagonal of the parallelogram with sides a and b and the angle θ
between these sides. Of course, the parallelogram law is just the law of linear
(two dimensional Hilbert space) algebra: for finding the length c of the sum
c of vectors a and b having lengths a and b and the angle θ between them.
We also can introduce complex waves by using the following elementary
formula:
a2 + b2 + 2ab cos θ = |a+ beiθ|2 . (13)
Thus the context transitions S → Sj can be described by the wave of prob-
ability:
ϕ =
√
PS→S1PS1(E) +
√
PS→S2PS2(E)e
iθ(S→Sj ;E).
5 CONTEXTUAL PROBABILISTIC DERIVA-
TION OF THE SUPERPOSITION PRIN-
CIPLE IN THE TWO SLIT EXPERIMENT
We shall study in more details the possibility of contextual (purely classical)
derivation of the superposition principle for complex probability amplitudes,
‘waves’, in the two slit experiment. We consider one dimensional model. It
could be obtained by considering the distribution of particles on one fixed
straight line, very thin strip. It is supposed that the source of particles is
symmetric with respect to slits and the straight line (on the registration
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screen) pass through the center of the screen. This geometry implies that
coefficients PS→Sj = 1/2, j = 1, 2. By the symbol Ex, x ∈ R, is denoted the
event of the registration of a particle at the point x of the straight line. We
set: p(x) = PS(Ex) and pj(x) = PSj (Ex), j = 1, 2. These are probabilities
that a particle would arrive to the point x (of the registration screen) under
the complexes of physical conditions S and Sj , respectively. By using (10)
we get:
p(x) =
1
2
[p1(x) + p2(x) + 2
√
p1(x)p2(x) cos θ(x)].
This is just the special case of the general transformation of probabilities
induced by context-transitions. By using (13) we represent this probability
as the square of a complex amplitude, p(x) = |φ(x)|2, where
φ(x) =
1√
2
(eiθ1(x)
√
p1(x) + e
iθ2(x)
√
p2(x)) (14)
and probabilistic phases θj(x) are chosen in such a way that the phase shift
θ1(x) − θ2(x) = θ(x). We also introduce complex amplitudes for probabil-
ities pj(x) : φj(x) =
1√
2
eiθj(x)
√
pj(x). Here pj(x) = |φj(x)|2. The complex
amplitudes are said to be wave functions: φ(x) is the wave function on (the
straight line of) the registration screen for both slits are open; φj(x) is the
wave function on (the straight line of) the registration screen for jth slit is
open.
Let us set ξ(x) = θ(x)
h
, where h > 0 is some scaling factor. We have:
φ(x) =
1√
2
(e
iξ1(x)
h
√
p1(x) + e
iξ2(x)
h
√
p2(x)) and φj(x) =
1√
2
e
iξj (x)
h
√
pj(x).
By choosing h as the Planck constant we get a quantum-like representation
of probabilities. We recall that we did not use any kind of wave arguments.
Superposition rule (14) was obtained in purely classical probabilistic (but
contextual!) framework.
Suppose now that ξ depends linearly on x : ξj(x) =
pjx
h
, ξ(x) = px
h
,p =
p1 − p2. Under such an assumption we shall get interference of two ‘free-
waves’ corresponding to momentums p1 and p2. Of course, this linearity
could not be extracted from our general probabilistic considerations. This is
a consequence of the concrete geometry of the experiment.
We underline that we did not have in mind to create some alternative
to the standard calculus of probabilities in Hilbert space. Our aim was
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demystification of this calculus. We demonstrated that we could use the
conventional ensemble viewpoint to probability (as it was proposed by A.
Einstein) even in experiments with quantum systems. However, we should
not forget about the fundamental principle of contextual probabilities.
Finally, we remark that starting with this principle we obtain not only
the standard trigonometric cos-like interference, but also hyperbolic cosh-
like interference, see [5] for the details. The latter calculus of (hyperbolic)
probabilities could be realized (parallely to the standard quantum calculus)
in the so called hyperbolic Hilbert space, see [5]. Another way to get a linear
representation for the hyperbolic probabilistic transformation () is to use
the formalism of Positive Operator Valued Measures, see e.g. [8]. Thus we
can say that starting with very natural and clear postulate on contextual
probabilities we can get the well known POVM-calculus, [9].
However, the reader can say:
“Well, QM was demystified, by using contextual probabilities. But, fi-
nally, you reproduced the standard probabilistic calculus in the Hilbert space
(in its generalized POVM-form). Could you present some practical conse-
quences of your contextual reduction to conventional probability theory?”
This question will be discussed in the next section.
6 CONTEXTUAL VIEWPOINT TO QUAN-
TUM INFORMATION
What is the main difference between orthodox Copenhagen interpretation of
QM and contextual interpretation (Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, [10])?
By the Copenhagen interpretation the origin of the very special quantum
statistics is in the very special behaviour of so called quantum systems. Here a
wave function describes an individual system. Superposition is superposition
of states for an individual system.
By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation the origin of the very special quantum statis-
tics is in the very special complexes of physical conditions that are used to
prepare ensembles of physical systems. Here a wave function (as it was
claimed by Einstein) describes not an individual physical system, but an en-
semble prepared under some complex of physical conditions. Superposition
is not an individual property. It is related to statistical superposition in an
ensemble. This is superposition of complexes of physical conditions.
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The main fundamental consequence of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation for quan-
tum computing is that macroscopic classical physical systems could in princi-
ple exhibit quantum probabilistic behaviour under special complexes of phys-
ical conditions - special preparation procedures for ensembles of such systems.
In particular, the statistical superposition property could be induced by en-
sembles of macroscopic classical physical systems. Thus so called quantum
parallelism of computations could be realized by ensembles of macroscopic
classical physical systems.
Of course, the Va¨xjo¨ viewpoint to quantum parallelism differs crucially
from the Copenhagen viewpoint. By the Copenhagen interpretation after
the act of quantum computation (unitary evolution) the quantum state of
an individual physical system contains all possible values of a Boolean func-
tion f under computation. By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation all possible values
of f could be computed by performing computations over a large statistical
ensemble of physical system. By the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation the origin of the
huge computational power of quantum computers is not in quantum par-
allelism, but it is a consequence of the possibility to prepare ensembles of
physical systems such that some fixed value of some parameter should be
realized with probability that is close to probability 1. Therefore there is
nothing mysterious that such a preparation could be in principle realized for
macroscopic classical systems.
Our main prediction for quantum computing is the possibility to create
macroscopic classical quantum computer.
Remark. The combination “classical quantum” looks as nonsense. How-
ever, we recall that here quantum is related only to special probabilistic
behaviour of ensembles physical systems.
At the moment we could not present any concrete model of such a clas-
sical/quantum computer. However, we underline that quantum probabilistic
behaviour could be found in various processes involving macroscopic systems,
e.g. in economy.
Another consequence of the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation is the possibility to re-
duce quantum randomness to conventional ensemble randomness. This sup-
ports the original Einstein’s viewpoint that QM is not complete and some
finer description of physical reality is in principle possible.
Finally, we remark that the contextual probabilistic approach to Bell’s
inequality [2], [11]-[13], demonstrated that there is no contradiction between
the local realist description and violation of Bell’s inequality by correlations
calculated for special ensembles of physical systems (quantum systems). Con-
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textual probabilistic analysis of Bell’s argument induced new inequalities that
are not violated by quantum correlations, see [12], [13].
So if we follow to the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of QM the problem of quantum
nonlocality is still open! Of course, our arguments [2], [11]-[13], could not be
considered as arguments against nonlocality. It may be that QM is nonlocal!
However, from the contextual probabilistic viewpoint Bell’s arguments did
no prove nonlocality of QM. There should be found some other arguments.
Our contextual viewpoint to quantum nonlocality has important conse-
quences for quantum cryptography - the only quantum information scheme
that (at the moment) is well developed for real applications. The possibil-
ity to represent in principle quantum correlations by classical probabilistic
integrals induces some doubts in security of modern quantum information
schemes.
Suppose that the classical reduction for quantum correlations would be
possible. Then the only special source of security of quantum cryptographic
schemes would be high (classical) sensibility of quantum systems to external
perturbations.
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